See, §§860(h)(1), 6324A(a), 6601(e)(1)–(2), 6602, 7122(b). There would, for example, be no need for §6671(a) to deem “tax” to refer to certain assessable penalties if the Code al-ready included all such penalties in the term “tax.” Indeed, ’s earlier observation that the Code requires assessable penalties to be assessed and collected “in the same manner as taxes” makes little sense if assessable penalties are themselves taxes.
As Alexander Hamilton put it, “the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose,.” The Federalist No. The Act’s 10 titles stretch over 900 pages and contain hundreds of provisions. Beginning in 2014, those who do not comply with the mandate must make a “[s]hared responsibility payment” to the Federal Government. That payment, which the Act describes as a “penalty,” is calculated as a percentage of household income, subject to a floor based on a specified dollar amount and a ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual would have to pay for qualifying private health insurance. In 2016, for example, the penalty will be 2.5 percent of an individ-ual’s household income, but no less than 5 and no more than the average yearly premium for insurance that covers 60 percent of the cost of 10 specified services (; 42 U. There is no immediate reason to think that a statute applying to “any tax” would apply to a “penalty.” Congress’s decision to label this exaction a “penalty” rather than a “tax” is significant because the Affordable Care Act describes many other exactions it creates as “taxes.” See argues that even though Congress did not label the shared responsibility payment a tax, we should treat it as such under the Anti-Injunction Act because it functions like a tax.
(b) Section 1396c gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to penalize States that choose not to participate in the Medicaid expansion by taking away their existing Medicaid funding. Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 133 percent of the poverty level. , is of the view that the Spending Clause does not preclude the Secretary from withholding Medicaid funds based on a State’s refusal to comply with the expanded Medicaid program.
The original program was designed to cover medical services for particular categories of vulnerable individuals.
The Anti-Injunction Act therefore does not bar this suit. Upholding the Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause would give Congress the same license to regulate what people do not do. None of this is to say that payment is not intended to induce the purchase of health insurance. (c) Even if the mandate may reasonably be characterized as a tax, it must still comply with the Direct Tax Clause, which provides: “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” Art. It therefore need not be apportioned so that each State pays in proportion to its population. Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to the Federal Government “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.” , 4 Wheat. In this case we must again determine whether the Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many States and individuals believe it does not possess. The Consti-tution may restrict state governments—as it does, for example, by forbidding them to deny any person the equal protection of the laws. “Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government” requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if “the lack of constitutionalauthority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated.” , 106 U. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them.
The Framers knew the difference between doing something and doing nothing. Ignoring that distinction would undermine the principle that the Federal Government is a government of limited and enumerated powers. The individual mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power and draw within its regulatory scope those who would otherwise be outside of it. concluded in Part III–B that the individual mandate must be construed as imposing a tax on those who do not have health insurance, if such a construction is reasonable. But the mandate need not be read to declare that failing to do so is unlawful. Resolving this controversy requires us to examine both the limits of the Government’s power, and our own limited role in policing those boundaries. The Federal Government has expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, but it still must show that a constitutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions. But where such prohibitions donot apply, state governments do not need constitutional au-thorization to act. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices. A majority of the Fourth Circuit panel reasoned that the individual mandate’s penalty is a tax within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act, because it is a financial assessment collected by the IRS through the normal means of taxation. In order to receive that funding, States must comply with federal criteria governing matters such as who receives care and what services are provided at what cost. Because no party supports the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the individual mandate canbe completely severed from the remainder of the Affordable Care Act, we appointed an to defend that aspect of the judgment below. This statute protects the Government’s ability to collect a consistent stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of taxes. The penalty for not complying with the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate first becomes enforceable in 2014.